






















Problems, Design Problems, and Designers: Decision-
Making in Action 
Steve Harfield 
University of Technology Sydney 
\'Xlhile it is undeniable that both design and design education seek to engage with meaningful 
problems and to achieve desirable solutions, much of design education is still hostage to the twin 
notions (i) that problems constitute sets of external conditions presented to the designer for the 
most efficacious solution and (ii) that the potential problem-solver is somehow neutral in respect of 
the problems s/hc engages with, 'merely' applying extant skills and knowledge to achieve their 
solution. This m.indset can easily mistake design education for the provision of just such technical 
skills and knowledge, and fails to take due cognisance of the cenu·al role of the problem-solver in 
<~stablishing just what problem is actually being soly;_ed in any particular case. In elucidating this the 
paper argues that meaningful problems a1·e to a significant extent self-determined by the design 
problem-solver; that there is an intrinsic, and often under-acknowledged, link between problem-
setting and the establishment of outcome possibilities; and that relevant criteria of outcome 
acceptability or desirability cannot be known, to either designer or client, in advance of both 
personal problem-setting and the advancement of solution-candidates. 
Introduction 
For more than half a century now, from at least the 1950s, and across a range of design 
disciplines, from product and graphic design through to architecture and engineeti.ng, 
contributors to the body of design literature have conunitted themselves, either tacitly or 
explicitly, to the view that design is a problem-solving activity. \)Jhilc arguments may be 
advanced to refute or, at least, substantially qualify, tills view, i.e. to establish that, in 
important resects, design is difformt from problem solving; and willie a number of 
contemporary writers on design have sought to investigate the nature of design problems 
from a more sophisticated perspective - the writings of Dorst (2003), Dorst & Cross 
(2001), Jonas (1993), and Restrepo & Christiaans (2003) may be cited here - the 
'desigH=prob!eJJ!-sOilling' equation nevertheless still tends to present itself as a self-evident 
given of design thinlcing. 
Tills being the case it is usual that the tasks facing designers, both in practice and, 
perhaps more significantly for this paper, in the context of design education, are framed in 
the conventional language of problems and problem solving, v,lj_th its attendant, and 
frequently unchallenged, assumptions about the rationality of problem solving, the nature 
of problem-solving techniques, and the relations between problems and solutions. This is 
not to suggest that the construal of design tasks as probletns, and design responses as 
solutions to such problems, is not potentially useful in explaining certain issues pertaining 
to the design process, particularly in the context of the education of yonng designers, 
whether at tertiary or at secondary level, but rather that an unreflective and overly-
simplistic acceptance of the problem/ solution binary effectively masks a number of crucial 
aspects of the relations betm;en problems, solutions and problem-solvers that are essential to 
w1derstanding how the act of designing actually proceeds. 
It is for this reason that the conventional nomenclature of 'design problems' and 
'desit,m problem solving' has been retained pro letn: to facilitate the argument that, in 
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significant ways, design 'problems' are not what they are taken for granted to be. Needless 
to say, in such a short presentation this issue can be addressed only briefly and, by way of 
establishing focus, the paper will contend that, while it is w1deniable that both design and 
design education seek to engage with meaningful problems and to achieve desirable 
solutions, much of design education is still hostage to the twin notions, first, that problems 
constitute sets of external conditions presented to the designer for the most efficacious 
solution and, second, that the potential problem-solver is somehow neutral in respect of 
the problems s/he engages with, 'merely' applying extant skills and knowledge to achieve 
their solution. This mindset can easily mistake design education for the provision of just 
such technical skills and knowledge, and fails to take due cognisance of the central role of 
the problem-solver in establishing ;i1st 1vhat problem is actllai!J bei11g so/ped in any particular 
case. 
On this basis, the paper argues: (i) that meaningful problems are to a significant extent 
self-determined by the design problem-solver; (ii) that there is an intrinsic, and often 
under-valued, link between designer-driven problem-setting and the establishment of 
outcome possibilities; (iii) that therefore relevant criteria of outcome acceptability or 
desirability cannot be known in advance of both personal problem-setting and the 
advancement of solution-candidates; and, finally, (iv) that these observations are of critical 
significance for design education. 
Determining Design Problems 
When, in primary or secondaty school, pupils arc set simple mathematical problems -
what are six sevens, or what is the square root of 144- then we know in advance of their 
asking that, notwithstanding the range of answers that might be forthcoming from the 
novice problem-solvers, such problems can yield only one, or, in the second case, tJJIO, 
acceptable solutions. Basic mathematics _.is, in this sense, a closed system: specific and 
limited numbers of solution-finding methods are available to, and may be learned by, the 
problem-solver; and the problems themselves yield outcomes that can be classified as 'ali-
or-none' solutions that can be assessed as being either right or wrong. 
In marked contrast to this, design solutions are taken to epitomize what arc known as 
satiificing or 'better-or-worse' solutions, i.e. solutions that can be assessed only 
relativistically according the extent to which they satisfy some set of 'imposed' criteria. 
This is, of course, a long-standing 'given' for designers and design educators that brings 
with it not the implication but the fact that all design problems, properly-so-called, can 
result in a variety of different possible solutions. There is no 'right' answer, but judgments 
can be made on the design proposals offered - what we might call the 'solution-
candidates'- on the basis of how Jvell they 'solve', or, more accurately, resolve, the issues 
established by the problem. And as professional designers well know - and design 
students rapidly come to learn - 'how well' is determined not only by the fact t!Jat a 
solution has been reached, but on the designerly matmer of that resolution. 
Now, while this sounds both simple and con1111onscnsical, it has a number of 
inunediate implications. The first of these is the by now well-established understanding 
that the majority of design problems fall into that large class of problems variously 
identified as ill-defined (Reitman, 1964; Eastman, 1969), ill-structured (Newell, 1969; 





















































































1972; Rittel and Webber, 1973). While we will return to the idea of wickedness in due 
course, it is sufficient, for the moment, to note that design problems are regarded as being 
ill-structured on the basis that design problem-solving is open-ended, that is to say: no 
definitive design solution can be reached; a variety of distinctly different outcomes are 
possible depending on the specific inputs; there is no algorithm for generating solutions; 
and there is no formalized way of knowing when to stop the process of solution-finding. 
Of these conditions, the second, that each individual problem can, in principle, lead to 
multiple solutions, presents us with a number of further implications for design thinking. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that desi&,>-n problems are presented to designers by external 
agencies (clients, or, in the case, educational problem-setters) and with specific 
requirements (nominally represented by the brief). It is further taken as read, first, that the 
dcsit,m process is thus initiated ~)' this ex/emal problem-setter, who, on the basis of a set of 
extant requirements, 'commissions' the desit,rtler to produce an outcome that will 
satisfactorily meet such requirements; and;· second, that, willie this set of specific 
requirements docs not provide, automatically and without further expert input, a direct 
specification of the outcome per .re - to do so would suggest that the design is already to 
hand and thus make the role of the designer nugatory - the input required of the designer 
comprises a comprehensive and rational analysis of the brief, undertaken in the light of, 
and infonned and augmented by, the expert knowledge of the designer, such that the most 
appropriate outcome for the given requirements may be determined (Barfield, 2007b, p.1 ). 
This, in tum, is suggestive of t\vo further presumptions about design outcomes. The 
first of these is the uncontentious claim that, based on the same brief, different designers 
will inevitably produce different outcomes. The second, again usually taken as read, is that 
the differences in such outcomes can be attributed to differences in the range and level of 
the skills, experience, professional competence, talent and imagination that the designer 
(or design team) can bring to bear on this common brief in preparing the design proposal. 
"While this is undeniably accurate - differential skill sets are to be expected in both novice 
and professional designers alike -- this account of outcome difference is, it will be argued, 
i11complete, and therefore erro11cous, on the basis that it overlooks an essential and inescapable 
clement in design problem solving: the self-determination by the problem-solver of the 
actual 'problem' to be solved. 
That this is overlooked is hardly surprising. To talk about 'the design problem' at all -
in educational terms, perhaps, the 'design problem as set' - tacitly endorses a well-
established but conspicuously under-explored assumption, viz: that sharing a common 
brief means that designers engaging with this brief are, therefore aud 11ecessari(y, sharing a 
common problem. Stated another way, this received view asserts that, in any given 
instance, the great variety of different 'satisficing' solutions that design problems allow 
emanate from a single shared problem identified by the requirements listed in the brief (to 
which, we might add, individual problem-solvers apply rational analysis and individuated 
skill sets). , 
Y ct tllls, it will be contended, is not the case. As has been argued elsewhere (Barfield 
2002, 2007a, 2007b), without either ignoring or wilfully defo11ning the requirements 
identified in the brief, it is not this 'problem-as-given' that the designer 'solves' but rather a 
substantially revised and personalized problem, titled here the Jroble!JI-as-desigu-goa!', that 
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both subsumes the original problem and imposes upon it a range of designer preferences, 
prejudices and expectations. Hence, starting from the same brief, different designers will 
necessarily produce different outcomes not merely on the basis of differential skill sets but 
because, in substantial ways, ib~y are solvi11g d!ffermt .Problmts. Design problems are 
meaningful not just because they address teclmically meaningful requirements, but because 
they are to a significant extent self-determined by the design problem-solver, and cannot 
help being so-determined. To use a convenient shorthand: an architectural design 
competition, or a studio of architecture students, does not produce, as is conventionally 
thought, fifty different solutions to the same problem, but rather fifty different solutions 
to fifty different pro blcms! 
In sit,>nificant ways, then, designers construct the problems that they seek to solve. 
"Design problems are ... not just 'received' by the designer in the form of a set of extant 
and fixed requirements, nor are such problems merely augmented by the designer on the 
basis of professional expertise, to establish the problem-as-given. Rather, the collective 
requirements of the problem-as-given arc synthesized and internalised by the designer, and 
are further augmented, incorporated and subsumed into a more specific and targeted and 
personal entity ... the 'problem-as-design-goal' ... The fonn and content of each design 
outcome is thus based not on answering the question 'how have you elected to solve the 
problem-as-given?' but rather on determining 'on the basis of the problem-as-given, what 
further and designer-specific problem has been generated and selected for solution?' The 
problem-as-design-goal thus constitutes the individual designer's overlay on the brief that 
determines what she or he wants to do with the general problem presented." (Barfield, 
2007b, p.3). 
Such personalization of design problems - what I have dubbed 'problematization' 
(Barfield, 2007a, pp.159ff)- stems from the fact that designers arc clearly not objective 
and neutral in respect of design issues. They do act from personal self-interest, and they 
bring to bear on the problem-as-given not only a range of professional skills and 
knowledge (plus, one trusts, creativity and imagination), but also a set of personal and 
varied (and perhaps idiosyncratic) views about the nanue of design itself. With this 
ostensive 'design world view', and different for each individual designer, comes a range of 
ideological or aesthetic or ethical or technological beliefs and commitments which 
determine not merely 'how is this problem-as-given to be solved?' in a pragmatic sense, 
but rather, on the basis of this initial problem specification, but substantially going beyond 
it, 'what is the problem that I as designer choose to adopt and solve?'. 
Now this, of course, is not, in any way, to suggest that the designer ignores the set of 
requirements established by the brief. What it does suggest, however, is that this brief is 
merely the starring point for the designer's thinking, and not, it should be added, merely 
the designer's thinking about how rationally to engage v.ri.th this problem, but how to 
establish the nature of the personalized problem that tills brief allows - perhaps, even, 
necessitates - and that will inform and constrain both the design activity and the final 
outcome in ways that arc not dictated by the brief itself. 
"For each designer each design is 'their' design, a personal exploration and statement 
that not only serves the clients' or users' interests, but does so in a Jvq_y that reflects the 






















































































This imposition of 'self onto 'problem' is a clear instance of what might be called 
designer-driven problem-setting. The issue, and the significance, of problem setting or 
problem finding ~ as opposed simply to problem solving - has evoked wide discussion 
across a range of disciplines. Within design circles SchOn's (1983) work deserves attention, 
while useful perspectives on ideology and normative positions in dcsit,.m thinking, and on 
the idea of 'discovering' the design problem, arc provided by Rowe (1987) and Lloyd & 
Scott (1994) respectively. Within the more general theoretical literature the work of 
Getzels (1975, 1979), Jay and Perkins (1997) and Runco and Dow (1999) provide useful 
insights. 
What should be noted about this literature, however, is that it still tends to treat the 
problem in isolation from the potential solution and thus objectifies the problem, 
assmning that problem fmding is essentially a rational and quasi-objective activity. Under 
this view problem finding is good because it identifies significant gaps in our knowledge; 
because it focuses attention on issues that have not previously been explored; in short, 
because it gives us new problems to work on. \XIhile this is undoubtedly important for 
design, as it is for a number of other disciplines, it signally fails to appreciate another and 
far mote prevalent enactment of problem-setting- the imposition of self onto problem in 
desit,rn situations - which has significant implications for our understanding of the 
problem-solving process, the relations between problems and solutions, and the criteria 
used to assess design outcomes. 
In saying this we arc asserting not that design problem-setting occupies a space outside 
existing problems, nor that such 'new' problems arc divorced from potential future 
solutions on the grounds that such solutions have not been considered yet, but rather (i) 
that such problem setting occurs within the context of, and in response to, extant 
problems on which the designer is already 'working', and (ii) that such probl<~m setting is 
simultaneously a technique of problem solving (on the basis that such problem setting 
involves solution 'choosing', or, at least, conscious, if generalized, solution framing). 
Indeed, the two are effectively one: in considering the problem established by the brief 
the design.er both restricts and reconfigures the problem space by imposing on it what 
might be called a proto-solution, infonned by the aesthetic, formal, technological, and/ or 
ideological preferences of the individual designer. This reframing of the problem 
effectively 'writes the language' of the future solution, restricting its possibilities to a 
particular design set with which the designer is familiar and comfortable or towards which 
the designer feels some obligation, and to which the future solution will conform. This, it 
should be noted, is 110/ the unreflective adoption of a preconceived solution for a 
predetermined problem. It is, rather, the utilisation, by the designer, of a particular 
solution type - or perhaps a solution mode - as a means not to solve the 'orit,.>inal' 
problem-as-given, but to interrogate that problem, to set it within the designer's particular 
working universe, and to develop the 'new' problem, hence detennining 'what will be 
done'. In tlUs sense design 'problem solving' is not the objective and dispassionate analysis 
of some extemal set of requirements, nor the 'mere' rational deconstruction of needs and 
wants and their impartial reconfiguration into a coherent but neutral solution package, but 
rather the passionate and entirely partial imposition of the designer onto the problem-as-
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given, such that that designer's problem- which already de facto contains the language and 
impetus of its own solution - is drawn out and concretized as a specific, ~md now 
individually circumscribed, design goal. 
Tills proposition rehuns us to our earlier reference to wicked problems, a descriptor 
that, as Lloyd and Scott usefully renllnd us, does not suggest jmt a problem's lack of 
structure, but asserts that "a design problem and its solution arc linked in such a way that 
i11 order to tbi11k abo11t the problem the desig11er has to cotJJtJJit themseiPes to some sort cif sol11tiotr (1994, 
p.125, my emphasis). Tills constant interrelation between problem and solution -
discussed under the mbric of 'co-evolution' by Dorst and Cross (2001; see also Dorst, 
2003), but perhaps implying considerably more in this current context than the 'feedback 
loop' informing of the problem by reference to developing generations of solution-
candidates (and vice versa) - has a nwnber of sigtllficant implications for our 
understanding of design thinking and for design education. 
Implications for Design Thinking 
First, we might reiterate the earlier point that the proto-solution imposed on the problem 
by the designer at an early stage of the process is not just ai!J solution, used as a 
convenient test case; nor is it a solution derived by apparent deduction from analysis of 
the problem as given. Rather it is a conceptual schema, a solution 'framework', which has 
the effect of interpreting and delimiting the original problem in a manner consistent with 
the personal preferences and ideological position of the individual designer, 
To this we should immediately add, second, that this imposition of self on problem, 
this reconfit,)"·uration of the original problem in the light of personal preferences and 
ideolob,-ical commitments, is not necessarily a tYJIJ.rcio!ls imposition. It is not necessarily a 
decision, nor an intention, but perhaps an inevitability. Our experience of the everyday 
should confmn this: how we- and others.;;- 'see' the world, and how we act within it; what 
we do and what we wouldn't consider doing; arc, to a sigtlificant extent, detennined by our 
beliefs, our preferences and our prejudices, even if \Ve are unaware that we have thcrn, and 
even if they are simply 'taken for granted' and are thus effectively both commonsensical 
and/ or invisible. So too with the act of designing, and, to usc a simple example, we 
should all recognise that "the imposition of a minimalist 'style' onto a problem brief is not 
inescapably an act of choice" (Hatfield 2007a, p. 171 ). Our belief systems often do not allow 
us to think otherwise, and our desit,m problematizations - and thus our effective 'pre-
selection' of our design language, and the formal and aesthetic imperatives that flow from 
it - often could not have been othetv:ise! Perhaps tills is another reason why design 
problems are 'wicked': they do not allow of neutrality, and always speak of- and to -the 
designer! 
Third, and on the basis of tills, we should reiterate the central contention of this paper: 
viz, that it is no longer the problem-as-given that is being 'solved' but a 'new' and more 
precisely and more personally focused one. Consciously or other;visc, this is what the 
introduction of the proto-solution at such an early stage of the process does: it shifts and 
frames the 'new' designer-driven problem, and it is this problem which establishes the goal 
state, and against which the increasingly developed solution candidates arc judged. 
This in turn suggests, fourth, that design problems and design solutions arc more than 




















































































in meaningful senses !hi!J' are one and /be same. The very suggestion of a proto-solution - and 
the sequence of developing solution-candidates that follows from it - establishes the 
ongoing sequence of problems that arc being 'solved'. The solution becomes the problem. 
From a designer's perspective, every decision that is made about the ongoing development 
of the potential 'fmal' solution itself frames a problem state. A design (solution) decision 
to 'do x' evokes a range of considerations or questions- effectively a range of 'problems' 
- about 'how to do x' or 'precisely what x should be like', considerations that, while they 
might- or equally might not- be compared to the original problem specification, do not 
emanate from that specification but from the desit,mer's own problem/solution matrix. 
Effectively the question 'what will make me, as a designer, satisfied "\Vith the 'solution' I am 
now working towards?' has already been incorporated into the design process as 
rec1uirements and criteria specified in the new and evolving problem. 
Finally, and of key concern, is the question of how the imposition of this designerly 
self-interest impacts on the client. To the e~tent that the client (or, in this case, the 
educator) might be considered the initial brief-setter, then it must be assumed that s/he 
has both 'something' in mind at the beginning of the. process, and certain criteria against 
which tills potential 'something' can be assessed or measured. At the san1.e time, and as 
"\vith any design, it is taken as read that neither the client nor the designer can specify, in 
advance of its attainment, the precise nature of the final outcome. But between these two 
lies the contentious terrain of the design process, and if our current argument is accepted, 
then it suggests that, if the final design Oft/come cannot be specified in advance, then neither 
can (i) the 'final' problem slatemmt (of which the design is an outcome); nor (ii) the final list 
of desirable req11iremmt.r (which inform this problem statement); nor (iii) the final Ollltome 
C!iletia (upon which the 'solution' is judged). 
Irrespective of the starting point all three of these remain in a state of flux. As the 
design is developed - as tentative solution proposals emerge and arc vetted by both 
designer and client - then so too emerge additional and different requirements and criteria 
generated in response to such solution-candidates. In other words, as designing proceeds 
both designer a11d c/ie11t come to understand what it is they 'want' from this design. And 
these wants - and the criteria that are hamessed to assess them - have not been retained, 
simply and 'Xrithout change, from the initial list of requirements that established the 
problem-as-given, but have emerged, for both designer and client alike, from the 
designer's ongoing engagement with and transmutation of this problem into a specific and 
often more sophisticated design goal. 
And Education? 
If the idea of design is conventionally tied to problems and problem-solving, then it is also 
inescapably tied to expectatioNs, expectations that arc, for students, designers and clients 
aUke, infonned by, influenced by, and, to large degree, controlled by, a universe of 
preferences, prejudices, beliefs and assumptions. And if this universe of influences is too 
often less than conscious to our design thinking, or if certain of these assumptions are 
actually embedded in the minds of students by virtue of their design education, then 
perhaps it is time that we looked at such education more critically. 
In doing so, and in the light of this paper, four strongly intcrcotmected issues are 
paramount. 
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First, the received view of design as a rational and effectively neutral problem solving-
process must be seriously re-examined by desit,m educators. This suggests not only that 
educators themselves must re-think and take a critical stance on the presumption that 
externally-delivered design briefs, and, more importantly, the intelligent and 'distanced' 
analysis of such, constitute the central motivator of design, but that design stude11ts must be 
alerted to this. Design outcomes arc not 'simply' the result of thorough and quasi-
objective analysis of the brief as provided. 
Second, and following from this, both students and educators must be made aware of 
the often less than rational inputs and influences that condition, not to say control, define 
and limit, their thinking about and enactment of the design process. Without necessarily 
being able to identify them definitively, the presence and the effect(s) of specific 
theoretical and ideological commitments, and of particular preferences and prejudices, 
tastes and desires, must be recognised and understood as inescapable contributors to both 
the analysis of, and the determination of, design problems. 
Hence, third, the central role of the individual designer- not merely as the 'doer' who 
solves the problem but as the active agent who, in any given instance, and in key ways, 
albeit potentially unconsciously, initiates, develops, personalizes and concretizes the actual 
problems that are to be solved ~ must be recognized and premiated. Contrary to the 
received view, it is not only design solutions that emanate from the individual designing 
agent but, in major respects, the design problems themselves, a causative effect that in turn 
effectively pre-detennincs the range and nature of the solution possibilities open to the 
agent, and that educators must be at pains to convey to their students. Designers 
effectively construct the problems thqt they seek to solve. 
Finally, and in conjunction with all of the above, it is important that the potentially 
negative and restricting effects of any such predetennined assumptions, views and 
commitments, on both student problem Solvers and educational problems setters must be 
explored and revealed. While theoretical, fonnal and aesthetic 'blinkers' might usefully 
sharpen focus, and certainly aid and inform solution development, they simultaneously 
limit scope and reinforce preconceived expectations. 
And when the often unconscious preconceptions of the educational problem-setter, 
and, perhaps more importantly, of the educational .rolti!ion-assessor, are used, without 
appropriate realization, reflection and explanation, to vet ~ either positively or negatively ~ 
the individual proposals of the student problem solver, then 'education' is (again, 
potentially unconsciously) effectively replaced by 'the acceptable meeting ~ or otherwise ~ 
of prior expectations'. 
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